The "Canada Dry" pensions system is in some countries one of the frequent routes to early retirement. It constitutes an informal substitute for early retirement programs. Accordingly, firms lay off aged workers they find costly for what they produce and, to get their support, supplement unemployment benefits by some extra compensation that is paid until formal retirement. Whether the government cannot or does not want to stop these practises is not clear. In this paper we show that these practices may effectively be welfare improving. In other words, it may desirable to tolerate (or even encourage) some "abusive" uses of unemployment compensation schemes.
Introduction
In a number of countries (France, Italy, Germany, The Netherlands and Belgium) there is a fairly wide gap between the statutory and the effective retirement age. This gap raises obvious problems for the financing of social security in a world of aging populations.
It can be explained by a variety of provisions that allow individuals to stop working well before the standard age. To begin with, the retirement system itself allows and effectively often encourages people to retire before they have reached the statutory age.
While early retirement may come at the price of a reduction in benefits, these remain often quite generous, and are far greater than they would be under strict actuarial criteria. Several studies have shown that the structure of retirement benefits (and the implicit tax on continued activity implied by the benefit formula) has a significant impact on inactivity rates among the 55-64 age group in OECD countries. 1 Second, there are professions (such as mining, teaching, the police, the armed forces, etc.) where the official retirement age is lower than the standard age. Third, there are specific early retirement programs, usually targeted at sectors experiencing economic difficulties.
Finally, disability insurance and unemployment insurance are used in some countries to allow older workers to retire well ahead of the standard age, even though they are not suffering from a serious disability and are not necessarily unable to find a job.
In this paper, we focus on the last of these avenues into early retirement, namely the one via the unemployment insurance. In the literature on early retirement, the standard argument is that workers cease to work because they can obtain generous benefits. 2 This is the case of early retirement programs and also of disability insurance, but not necessarily of unemployment insurance. Then, why do so many aged workers use this exit route? Two reasons for this. First they can be forced in. Second, they can be bribed in and this is where here the notion of "Canada Dry pension" appears. Specifically, workers who go into unemployment and accept a compensation making up for the difference between their salary and the unemployment benefit are sometimes called Canada Dry pensioners. Like the "Canada Dry Ginger Ale looks like beer, has the color of beer, but 1 Gruber and Wise (1999) and Blondal and Scarpetta (1998 a,b). 2 Cremer et al. (2004) , Fenge and Pestieau (2005) .
is not beer", these packages consisting of an unemployment compensation plus a more or less open payment look like but are not regular pensions. 3 Even though the expression "Canada Dry" pension is above all used in Belgium, the practice is widespread in Europe. It can be seen as an informal substitute for early retirement schemes which do not exist everywhere. 4 It is clear that Canada Dry pensions are legally questionable for two reasons. First, unemployment insurance is not aimed at helping elderly workers into exiting the labor force. Second, the lump-sum compensation that makes such an early retirement device acceptable to unions and workers is not always reported or properly taxed. The attitude of public authorities towards Canada Dry pensions is often ambiguous. As a matter of fact this ambiguity appears to be both intentional and unavoidable. At times, one has the feeling that they want to close their eyes before a practice that basically they find desirable. At other times, one has the impression that in any case, even if they wanted it, they couldn't stop these practices for lack of observable evidence.
In this paper we study why a Canada Dry pensions system can appear, but also why the government can be lead to tolerate it even though it could prevent it. In fact, the issue at hand is quite general. There are a number of instances where a governing authority close its eyes before practice that are not "entirely legal" for reasons of implementability or lack of information. For example, Pestieau et al. (2006) show that when there is a small minority of taxpayers that happen to be much less averse to risk than the majority, it may be socially desirable to let them evade taxation if the cost of control is high.
We use a stylized model of the labor market. There are three types of individuals: high ability workers, low ability workers and permanently unemployed individuals. Individuals of this latter type cannot find a job (for whatever reason) and are unemployed 3 Old commercials for Canada Dry ginger ale on the European continent. 4 A good illustration of this is provided by the reaction to the application of stricter rules of eligibility for traditional early retirement schemes in Belgium. Following this reform, the Belgian unemployment agancy (ONEM) reported in 2002 a tendency towards more exit of the labor force via the unemployment insurance which they impute to the Canada Dry pensions mechanisms. As a result, the share of expenditures of ONEM towards long term unemployment insurance for the old jumped from 14% in 1996 to 22% in 2002 whereas the share of expenditures towards the traditional early retirement schemes decreased from 22% in 1996 to 19% in 2002 (see OECD, 2003) .
regardless of the compensation they might obtain. All workers are paid the same wage.
Consequently, low ability workers are paid above their productivity and this provides an incentive to their employers to try to get rid of them. For reasons of labor market rigidities they cannot be simply fired. However, they may accept to quit if the unemployment compensation is large enough and/or if they are bribed into accepting their layoff through a Canada Dry pension.
The informational assumptions are also crucial. The government cannot observe individual productivities; in particular it cannot prevent high ability individuals from claiming unemployment insurance (after arranging to get laid off). Canada Dry pensions on the other hand are awarded by the firms who do observe worker's productivities and who can target them to the low ability individuals. Thus, the Canada Dry pensions, though relying on a misuse of unemployment benefits, can act as an (imperfect and indirect) screening device which may mitigate policy imperfection that are due to asymmetric information.
We consider two situations. In the first one, the government can monitor the Canada Dry practice; particularly it could prevent them altogether. Nevertheless it may find it desirable to let some workers exit the labor force with some compensation beyond the unemployment benefit. This is the case when the government closes its eyes on the abuse of unemployment insurance and intervenes in the determination of the compensation. In the second situation, the government cannot control the compensation but and has only indirect leverage on the workers labor market status (through the level of unemployment compensation). We show that this solution can be desirable and preferred to the solution where Canada Dry pensions are not available.
The model Workers
We consider an economy with three types of workers. Type H consists of high ability workers with productivity w H while type L workers have low ability w L (w L < w H ).
Type U workers cannot find a job (for whatever reason) and are unemployed regardless of the compensation they might obtain. The number of type i workers is given by p i (i = H, L, U ) where P i p i is normalized to 1. Individual utility is given by
where c is consumption and with u (c) increasing and strictly concave. Labor supply is dichotomous with = 1 in case of work and 0 otherwise, while v i > 0 is the (type specific) labor disutility.
Firms
The representative firm uses a linear technology with labor as the only input. When offering a labor contract the firm cannot observe wether the worker is of type L or H.
Additionally, due to institutional rigidities, the firm cannot offer a wage contingent on the (ex-post) revelation of the workers productivity. When employing both types of workers, the profit of the firm is thus given by
where w is the wage offered to workers. Consequently, if types L and H individuals are both working, they each receive a wage w = (
The Canada Dry pension mechanism
Because all workers are paid the same wage, the firm may want to discharge type L workers once they are identified. However, to do so, it has to gain the acceptance of the type L workers possibly by paying them some compensation b ≥ 0 (or "a Canada Dry pension"). The profit they achieve after dismissing workers of type L is then equal to
it is positive as long as b ≤w − w L . Consequently the firm is ready to pay an amount up to b max = w − w L to each type L worker in order to bring him to accept his dismissal.
Note that when b = b max , the profit realized by the firm is equal to 0.
Because of informational asymmetries, the government cannot exclude type L workers from unemployment benefits when they are laid off. In other words it is not possible to distinguish the unemployed of type U from the unemployed of type L. Consequently, a worker of type L accepts to become unemployed if and only if:
where c U represents unemployment benefits (which equal the consumption level of type
This illustrates the main problem induced by the Canada Dry pension. A more generous unemployment insurance implies that the firm lays off type L workers more easily (i.e., at a lower cost) which may imply a social cost.
Government
The government maximizes a utilitarian welfare function that is given by
Further we assume that the profits of the firm are taxed at a 100% rate.
We shall first consider the first-best social optimum that is achieved when the government observes the productivity of each worker (Section 3). Then we turn to the second-best case where the government cannot observe individuals productivities (Section 4). We distinguish three different scenarios that differ in the way b is determined.
First best optimum
We consider first the case where individual productivities are observable and determine the (utilitarian) first-best allocation. An allocation here consists simply of a collection of
The problem that determines the first-best allocation is given by
where w U = U = 0 by assumption. It is plain that the solution implies
For simplicity we concentrate on the case where H = 1. We are then left with two cases, namely L = 1 (type H and type L individuals are employed) and L = 0 (only type H workers are employed. 5 In the first case, welfare is then given by
where we use superscript F B to denote First Best results. Similarly, when type L workers are not employed, the welfare level is given by:
Consequently, H and L type workers should both be employed if and only if
which is equivalent to
In words the utility increase associated with the extra consumption (shared by all types of workers) is sufficiently large to outweight the labor disutility of type L workers.
For the remainder of the paper we shall assume that this condition holds. In other words, we assume that in a first-best world, it is socially desirable to make type L work.
Asymmetric information 4.1 The information structure
Let us now assume that individual types and consumption levels are not publicly observable. The set of feasible allocations is then restricted by a certain number of incentive constraints which imply that the first-best optimum cannot be achieved anymore. As usual, a (utilitarian) solution with identical consumption levels but different labor supplies cannot be implemented (type H workers would always want to mimick type U workers). The possibility of Canada Dry pensions brings in an extra degree of complexity. In particular, it implies that c L , the consumption level of type L workers can no longer be directly controlled. What can be controlled is the consumption level (after tax income) of type L individuals in case they are employed. We shall denote this level by e c L . The effective consumption level of type L is then given by
The information structure we adopt is inspired by the Canada Dry pension mechanism detailed in section 2. Individuals of type U cannot work and thus they cannot mimick L or H individuals who are working. Individuals of type H can mimick L and U but cannot receive a Canada Dry transfer from the firm (it is never profitable for the firm to lay off type H workers). Finally, individuals of type L can mimick those of type H and U .
To study the second-best policies it is useful to define the incentive compatible and feasible domain D(b) for a given level of b ≥ 0. With labor supplies of type U and H workers set at l U = 0 and l H = 1 respectively an allocation can now be characterized
However, for our purpose it is more convenient to define the incentive compatible domain over the vector
where the relationship between c L and e c L is specified by (5) . We define this domain We now turn to the formal definition of these two subsets. First,
+ × {1} that satisfies the following constraints
The first equality (that implies of course c H = e c L ) states that type H and L workers do not mimick each other. Condition (7) Second, D 0 (b) is the set of (c H , e c L , c U , 0) ∈ R 3 + × {0} that satisfy the following conditions
Condition (10) One feature of these incentive constraints deserves some additional comments. The way they are set up implies that workers of type H can claim unemployment insurance (at level c U ). However, they can never obtain a Canada Dry pension. This is because as far as b is concerned, the screening takes place at the firm level and firms (unlike the government) do observe individual productivities. This specificity of Canada Dry pension applies in all the scenarios below irrespective of how its level is determined.
In the following sections, we shall determine the second-best optimum of the economy considering successively three scenarios indexed j = f, F C, NC that differ in the way b is determined. In scenario f , there is no Canada Dry pension i.e., we set b = 0. This can be seen as a benchmark case, but also as a case where the government is able to forbid Scenario Instruments the use of Canada Dry pension. In the second scenario, F C (full control), we assume that the level of b is set by the government along with the other tax instruments to maximize welfare. Observe that b being granted through the firm, it can effectively be targeted to type L workers (which is not possible for "regular" unemployment benefits c U ). In scenario NC (no control), the level of b is set by the firm to maximize its profits.
The firm will then set the lowest possible level of b that brings type L workers to accept their dismissal, provided that this level is not higher than b max (otherwise it will set b = 0). The third scenario is of course the one that describes the reality of Canada Dry pensions best. Specifically it is within this scenario that we can study how the Canada Dry pension affects the policy design (unemployment compensation and taxes). The other two scenarios are nevertheless useful in that they provide interesting benchmarks.
For each scenario we separately determine the optimal policies in D 1 (Regime 1) and in D 0 (Regime 0); the global optimum is then obtained by comparing the respective welfare levels. We summarize these alternative scenarios in Table 1 where each cell gives the corresponding level of welfare:
Scenario f
Assume for the time being that b = 0 (and recall that H = 1 and U = 0 is assumed throughout). The second-best problem is then to maximize welfare as specified by (1), with c L defined by (5), subject to the constraint (c H , e c L , c U , L ) ∈ D(0) requiring that the policy is in the feasible incentive compatible domain given b = 0.
Regime 1
The determination of the "best" policy here is rather simple. It is plain that (for given levels of i 's) maximizing utilitarian welfare amounts to set the different consumption levels as close as allowed by the incentive constraints. With b = 0, conditions (6)- (7) imply c H = e c L > c U .
Further, once c H = e c L is fixed, c U is also determined, either by (7) or by (8) depending on the maximum value of v i . We thus have
Substituting (14) into the resource constraint (9) yields
condition which implicitly defines c f 1 U , the only feasible (and thus optimal) consumption level of type U workers under Scenario f , Regime 1). Substituting into the welfare function yields
To understand this expression consider for instance the case where v L > v H . Then (7) is binding and
In words, type U and L workers have the same utility levels while type H individuals receive an extra "rent" of (v L − v H ).
Regime 0
Setting b = 0 and using (11), inequality (12) can be rewritten as
solution is necessarily in D 1 (0). It is characterized by (15) and welfare is given by W f 1 . When v L ≥ v H , on the other hand, D 0 (0) is non empty. Utilitarian welfare is once again maximized by setting c H as close as possible to c U so that (11) is binding and we have
Substituting into the resource constraint (13) yields 
U´. Consequently individuals of all three types have the same utility level and welfare is simply given by
Recall that this solution is feasible only when v L ≥ v H . 
Scenario

Regime 0
In this case, the government's problem is less straightforward than in the settings considered above. This is because we have b as an additional policy instrument which adds an extra degree of freedom to the government's maximization problem (that so far was rather degenerate). Recall that in Regime 0, L = 0 and we have c L = c U + b. Substituting this equation into (12) and (13) we can write the Lagrangean expression of the government's problem as follows:
where λ 1 , λ 2 ≥ 0. Having substituted for b, we are left with three decision variables, namely c U , c H and c L . The first-order conditions are given by
We show in the Appendix that the solution implies either λ 1 > 0 and λ 2 = 0 or λ 1 > 0 and λ 2 > 0. It then follows from (17) and (19) 
Scenario NC
In this scenario, the level of b is set by the firm to maximize its profits. The firm will then set the lowest possible level of b that brings type L workers to accept their dismissal, provided that this level is not higher than b max = w −w L (otherwise it will set b = 0). The Canada Dry pension is not publicly observable so that unemployed of type U and those of type L cannot be distinguished (and receive the same compensation).
Note that even though the government no longer controls b, it does have some indirect control over the workers labor market status. Specifically, the lower is the unemployment compensation c U (and the higher is e c L ) the more expensive it will be for the firms to induce the workers of type L to accept their dismissal. As for the previous scenarios we shall consider first Regime 1 and then Regime 0.
Regime 1
To achieve this regime, the policy must be chosen in
the highest level of b that the firm would be willing to pay is not sufficient to induce type L workers to leave their job. Recall that (6) implies c H = e c L . Furthermore, with a utilitarian welfare function, it is plain that c H = e c L should be as close as possible to c U . Assuming that (8) does not bind, the constraint (7) must then be binding and,
Consequently, the solution satisfies
and the values of c i can be obtained using the resource constraint. Compared to the optimum obtained when b is controlled ( (14) versus (20)) we see that the non observability of b implies an additional informational premium (rent) for both L and H so
In other words, if Regime 1 occurs, the possibility of Canada Dry pension is necessarily "a bad thing". If the firms could be prevented from using Canada Dry pensions, such a prohibition would be optimal here. Recalling that in Regime 1, the optimum under full control implied b = 0, this result does of course not come as a surprise.
To sum up, the optimum is described by
where c u is the solution to
Regime 0
We now turn to the policies that induce type L workers to quit the labor force. The 
The set of admissible policies associated with Regime 0 are then given by the set D 0 (b * ).
It can then easily be shown that the constraint (11) is necessarily binding. Condition (21) can then be rewritten as follows. Summing up, b * is determined by
Furthermore, this expression, along with the binding incentive constraint (11) and the resource constraint (13) completely determine the solution. Specifically, from the incen- so that c L and c U are obtained by solving the resource constraint
while making use of the definition of b * , equation (22). Substituting the solution into the welfare function then yields Table 2 summarizes the main results obtained so far. Furthermore, we have some results regarding the ranking of these welfare levels, in particular
The desirability of a Canada Dry pension
and (as long as W f 0 exists)
One way or the other, it is plain that the scenario F C can only dominate the others (at least weakly). However, if we want to assess the overall welfare impact of Canada Dry pensions, this is not the relevant comparison to make.
As mentioned in the introduction, the question we ask is the following. Is it possible that the second-best solution with Canada Dry pensions yields a higher level of welfare than the second-best without Canada Dry pension in a setting where the first-best is achieved when all types work. In other words, can it be desirable to induce type L workers via Canada Dry pensions to quit the labor force even when first-best efficiency call for all types of workers to stay in the labor force. Table 2 suggests that the answer to this question crucially hinges on the comparison between the levels of labor disutility,
Consider first the case where v L ≥ v H . In this setting, Canada Dry pension can be potentially welfare-improving only under the F C scenario. Under NC they are irrelevant and they will not effectively be used. Table 3 informational premium for types L and H workers. This premium is detrimental to type U individuals so that the government may want to make type L individuals not work.
In our informational setting, if it is not desirable to make type L not work, one way to Let us now turn to the case where v L < v H . In this situation Table 2 is much less informative because several of the welfare comparisons become ambiguous. This ambiguity of course also suggests, that there may be more room for a potentially welfare improving role of Canada Dry pensions, even when they are not observed and controlled by the government. To resolve this ambiguity we resort again to numerical illustrations; see Table 4 . These examples show that both cases are effectively possible. For w L = 1,
while w L = 1 yields W f 1 < W NC 0 . To understand why this latter result emerges, recall that when v L < v H , Regime 0 is not feasible when b is unavailable but it is when b is available. The welfare improving role of b emerges precisely when it is impossible to make type L workers stop working without the use of a Canada Dry pension. To be more precise, without a Canada Dry pension, when type L individuals stop working type H individuals would also quit the labor force. This problem is avoided when Canada Dry pensions are available to firms who target them to type L workers (recall that firms observe workers' types while the government does not).
To sum up, when (as in the example provided) NC yields a higher level of welfare than f, we can say that Canada Dry pensions are overall a good thing. Forbidding them, even if it were feasible would not be the right course of action.
Conclusion
In this paper we have shown not only why what we call a Canada Dry pensions system can appear, but also why the government can be lead to tolerate it even though it could prevent it. The Canada Dry pensions system appears when an employer has aged employees who cost more than they produce. In the absence of early retirement schemes, the employer bribes these costly old workers into unemployment. Unemployment compensation plus a more or less visible bribe make it acceptable for the workers to exit the labor force. In most instances, the government does not observe such a practice. If it did, it would prevent it forcing employers to keep their employees. However, there are cases when a social welfare maximizing government may find this practice desirable.
The problem studied in this paper is not restricted to the only issue of retirement.
It can appear whenever wages are superior to productivity and the only way for the employer to get rid of costly workers is to bribe them in some kind of social insurance, disability or unemployment. Naturally, with spot market wages and effective monitoring of social insurance, the practice of Canada Dry pensions would disappear. spot market wages would make it unneeded and effective monitoring of unemployment insurance would make it impossible.
